Furthermore, the final marriage is stable (Theorem 6). Proof by
contradiction.
- Assume that there is some pair (b,g) that prefer each other to
whomever they are matched to.
- Since b proposes strictly in order of his ROL, this means that
he must have proposed to g at some point.
- Since b isn't engaged to g, that means g must have rejected
b.
- But, g would only reject b for someone she ranks more highly.
- Therefore, by Theorem 3, g's final fiance is ranked more highly
than b.
- Therefore g doesn't prefer b to her mate.
Contradiction!
Since the algorithm always terminates (Theorem 5), and the
returned matching is stable (Theorem 6), then there is always a stable
marriage, for any well-formed set of ROLs (Theorem 2). Note that this
is a proof by algorithmic correctness!
Next: Boy Optimality
Up: UNDERSTANDING THE ALGORITHM
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