

Games of imperfect recall

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Monty Hall problem





image taken from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monty_Hall_problem

- Game show participants can choose one of three doors
- One door has a car, two have a goat
 - Assumption: car is preferred to goat
- Participant chooses door, but not opened yet
- At least one of the other doors contains a goat; the (knowing) host will open one such door (flips coin to decide if both have goats)
- Participant is asked whether she wants to switch doors (to the other closed door) – should she?

Sleeping Beauty problem


- There is a participant in a study (call her Sleeping Beauty)
- On Sunday, she is given drugs to fall asleep
- A coin is tossed (H or T)
- If H, she is awoken on Monday, then made to sleep again
- If T, she is awoken Monday, made to sleep again, then again awoken on Tuesday

Sunday Monday Tuesday




- Due to drugs she cannot remember what day it is or whether she has already been awoken once, but she remembers all the rules
- You're SB and you've just been awoken. What is your (subjective) probability that the coin came up H?

Information structure



Dutch book against Halfer [Hitchcock'04]


- A **Dutch book** is a set of bets that someone with a particular belief system would **each accept**, but that in combination lead to a **sure loss**
- Offer Beauty the following bet *whenever she awakens*:
 - If the coin landed Heads, Beauty receives 11
 - If it landed Tails, Beauty pays 10
- Argument: Halfer will accept, Thirder won't
- Also offer Beauty *on Sunday*:
 - If the coin lands Heads, Beauty will pay 12
 - If the coin lands Tails, Beauty will receive 13
- Argument: everyone will accept this one
- If it's Heads, Halfer Beauty will get $-12 + 11 = -1$
- If it's Tails, Halfer Beauty will get $13 - 10 - 10 = -7$
- Guaranteed loss!



Same bet twice!

The betting game


(ignoring the Sunday bet)



Evidential decision theory


- Idea: when considering how to make a decision, should consider what it would tell you about the world if you made that decision
- EDT Halfer: “With prob. $\frac{1}{2}$, it’s Heads; if I accept, I will end up with 11. With prob. $\frac{1}{2}$, it’s Tails; if I accept, then *I expect to accept the other day as well and end up with -20*. I shouldn’t accept.”
- As opposed to more traditional causal decision theory (CDT)
- CDT Halfer: “With prob. $\frac{1}{2}$, it’s Heads; if I accept, it will pay off 11. With prob. $\frac{1}{2}$, it’s Tails; if I accept, it will pay off -10. Whatever I do on the other day I can’t affect right now. I should accept.”
- EDT Thirder can also be Dutch booked
- CDT Thirder and EDT Halfer cannot
 - [Draper & Pust’08, Briggs’10]
- EDTers arguably can in more general setting
 - [Conitzer’15]

Sunday Monday Tuesday




Philosophy of “being present” somewhere, sometime

*simulated light (no direct
correspondence to light in
our world)*



1: world with creatures
simulated on a computer



2: displayed perspective of
one of the creatures

Erkenntnis
pp 1–13 | [Cite as](#)

A Puzzle about Further Facts

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Abstract

In metaphysics, there are a number of distinct but related questions about the existence of “further facts”—facts that are contingent relative to the physical structure of the universe. These include further facts about qualia, personal identity, and time. In this article I provide a sequence of examples involving computer simulations, ranging from one in which the protagonist can clearly conclude such further facts exist to one that describes our own condition. This raises the question of where along the sequence (if at all) the protagonist stops being able to soundly conclude that further facts exist.

Keywords

Metaphysics Philosophy of mind Epistemology

See also: [\[Hare 2007-2010, Valberg 2007, Hellie 2013, Merlo 2016, ...\]](#)

- To get from 1 to 2, need *additional* code to:
 - A. determine *in which real-world colors* to display perception
 - B. *which agent's* perspective to display
- Is 2 more like our own experience than 1? If so, are there *further facts* about presence, perhaps beyond physics as we currently understand it?