


Permissionlessness:

Byzantine parties < 50%.

Fraction of Byzantine computation power < 50%.




In expectation, next block is produced in 10 mins.

⇒ 20 CPUs → 10 mins.


40 CPUs → 5 mins.

~ 2 * 7 * 24 * 6.



Dynamic availability:

- 1 block in expectation every 10 mins ← 12secs; 2secs
- The time to propagate a block is ~ 10secs.



Q: forking rate observed in Bitcoin vs. Ethereum.

Network assumption:

synchrony: any message sent by a party will arrive within some bounded delay Δ .
 \implies (10secs).

Economic incentives: Block rewards: 6.25 BTC

\$19K \approx \$120K

Transaction fees:

Network connectivity: Peer-to-peer network.

Communication complexity: every party is connected to every other party.

Adding block: $O(n^2)$.

Committing a block: $O(n^2k)$

latency of a commit: k blocks (k confirmations)



n parties, t are corrupt.

Lamport, Shostak, Pease 1980: Byzantine General Problem.

Byzantine



Broadcast (BB)

Castle

commander.

(Attack, retreat).

Agreement: No two honest generals take different actions.

Termination: Eventually every honest general to attack or to retreat.

Validity: If commander is honest, then all honest generals follow commander's input.

Byzantine agreement: every party i has an input v_i .

Agreement: same as BB

Termination: same as BB.

Validity: if all honest parties have input $v_i = v$, then all honest parties output v .

Bitcoin: - general changes.

- validity:

BB

Bitcoin

- Only parties interested in

convincing an external

the result.

- Validity:
- Single-shot.

↳ would


External validity.

Sequence/log of transaction


State machine replication:

Multiple server replicas (parties), some of which may be faulty, and they provide you with an interface of a single non-faulty server.

Ideal world



SMR



Safety: (Agreement) No two non-faulty server replicas output different values at the same position of the log.

Liveness: (Termination, validity) Non-faulty server replicas keep committing new client transactions (valid).

Dolev-Strong Protocol for Byzantine Broadcast (1982).


Intuition: If at any point, a party receives a value/txn, then that party will share it with everyone.

If I know something in round r ,
all other parties will know it in $r+1$.

Round 1: Commander (sender) sends some value v
to all parties.



Round 2: If I receive a value v in round 1,
~~share~~ ^{send} that value to all other
parties.

Commit:
(Output) If I receive exactly one value v' ,
then output v' .
O.W. output \perp .



Attack 1: Commander does not send anything. ✗

Attack 2: Commander sends 2 different values



All honest see v & v' ; output \perp .

Attack 3: Commander sends v to half the parties.

Attack 3': Commander sends nothing to honest parties;
sends ~~the~~ value v to only malicious parties.

