Lecture 16 Linear Programming Duality

- two player zero-sum games

- each player has a set of strategies

- payoff matrix A, A[i,j] i E Trow, j E Trol Alij] = Trayoff to row player if row plays i Col plays J

for mixed strategies

payoff $P = \sum_{i \in T_{raw}} \sum_{j \in T_{raw}} ATi, j$. Prav, i Prol, j

prob. raw player plays strategy j

- LP duality

$$\chi_2 - 2\chi_3 \geqslant 2$$
 (2) optimal value $-\chi_1 - \chi_2 - \chi_3 \geqslant -7$ (3) OPT

conswer: show a feasible solution with value -1

$$(x, \chi_2, \chi_3) = (4, 3, 0)$$
- Prove OPT ≥ -1

$$(x_{1}, x_{2}, x_{3}) = (3, 2, 0)$$

$$2x_{1} - 3x_{2} + x_{3} = 0$$

$$2.5 \times (1) + 0.5 \times (3)$$

$$0.2 \times (3)$$
 $-0.2 \times (-0.2 \times 3)$

$$2X_{1}-3X_{2}-0.5X_{3} > -1$$

- generalizing the prost

$$\frac{\min}{\chi_1 - \chi_2 > 1} \frac{2\chi_1 - 3\chi_2 + \chi_3}{\chi_1 - \chi_2 > 1}$$

Lectures Page 2

- (lain: weak duality feasible of dual @ OPT of dual @ OPT of primal @ feasible of prima
dual Primal
- Theorem: strong duality OPT of dual = OPT of primed
And feasible Primal feasible
OPT for primal and dead